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Using ART to Make a Baby: How
Rhode Island’s Insurance Coverage
Mandate is Preventing Same-Sex
Couples from Having Biological
Children
Carla Centanni*
INTRODUCTION

Consider the following hypothetical: Paula and Mary are a
lesbian couple from Rhode Island who have been married since
2017.1 Just like their opposite-sex couple neighbors, Sarah and
Eric, Paula and Mary decide that they want to start a family. The
two couples have one thing in common: neither can start a family
without the help of assisted reproductive technology (ART). A
single cycle of treatment per each couple will cost approximately
$11,000 to $12,000. 2 However, because the success rate is 15.6%
per cycle, 3 and because the highest success rate of becoming
*
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams School of Law, 2020; B.A.,
Hartwick College, 2017. A special thank you to Professor Brittany Raposa for
her advice and guidance throughout the writing process and thank you to my
family and friends for all of your support.
1. The following example is based on a fictional couple created by the
author.
2. Cost of Fertility Treatment for Women and Men National Averages,
Ranges—And Our Prices, ADVANCED FERTILITY CTR. OF CHI. (2017),
https://www.advancedfertility.com/fertility-treatment-costs.htm
[https://perma.cc/Y448-LGRX] [hereinafter Cost of Fertility Treatment]. This
is an average cost of in vitro fertilization, a common infertility treatment. A
further explanation and breakdown of different fertility treatments will be
discussed later in this Comment. See infra section I.B.
3. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) Success Rates, CTR. FOR HUM. REPROD.,
https://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/about/pregnancyrates/
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pregnant occurs after six to nine cycles, 4 the couples will most likely
face a minimum cost of $66,000 for ART. The difference between
the two couples is that Sarah and Eric will receive insurance
coverage for their treatments, while Paula and Mary will have to
pay out-of-pocket because Rhode Island’s Infertility Insurance
Mandate (Infertility Insurance Mandate) does not apply to samesex couples.5 This law prevents Paula and Mary from receiving the
same coverage as their neighbors because they are a same-sex
couple and, therefore, will never be classified as infertile, which the
law requires in order to have these costs covered by insurance.6
The Infertility Insurance Mandate states that insurance
companies providing coverage for pregnancy must also provide
coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility. 7 Even
[https://perma.cc/QZ7Q-SHL8] (last updated Oct. 4, 2018).
4. Andrew D. A. C. Smith et al., Live-Birth Rate Associated With Repeat
In Vitro Fertilization Treatment Cycles, JAMA (Dec. 2015), https://jamanetwork.
com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2478204 [https://perma.cc/7P8A-EF5S].
5. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-19-23 (2017). For the full text of the Infertility
Insurance Mandate see infra note 7.
6. It was for this exact reason four lesbians brought an action in New
Jersey. See Krupa v. N.J. State Health Benefits Comm’n, No. 2:16-cv-4637SDW-LDW, 2018 WL 513208 (D. N.J. Jan. 23, 2018). In August of 2016, four
lesbians brought an action in New Jersey under the New Jersey statute that
governed insurance coverage for infertility treatments. Id. at *5–8. The
plaintiffs argued that the New Jersey statute was violating the individuals’
Due Process and Equal Protection rights. Id. at *8. Ultimately, the case was
dismissed under governmental immunity and there was no decision made as
to the constitutionality of the statute. See id. at *14–15. However, this lawsuit
did spark a change in the New Jersey legislation to expand to include samesex couples. See Susan K. Livio, Christie Expands Public Worker Fertility
Insurance Coverage to Include Lesbians, NJ.COM (May 2, 2017),
https://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/05/christie_oks_fertility_insurance
_coverage_for_lesb.html [https://perma.cc/5PXZ-VX88].
7. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-19-23. In full, the Infertility Insurance
Mandate provides the following:
(a) Any nonprofit hospital service contract, plan, or insurance policies
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed in this state, except
contracts providing supplemental coverage to Medicare or other
governmental programs, that includes pregnancy-related benefits,
shall provide coverage for medically necessary expenses of diagnosis
and treatment of infertility for women between the ages of twenty-five
(25) and forty-two (42) years and for standard fertility-preservation
services when a medically necessary medical treatment may directly
or indirectly cause iatrogenic infertility to a covered person. To the
extent that a nonprofit hospital service corporation provides
reimbursement for a test or procedure used in the diagnosis or
treatment of conditions other than infertility, those tests and
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though the statute has been amended throughout the years, the
Infertility Insurance Mandate remains unconstitutional because of
its disparate treatment of same-sex couples as opposed to oppositesex couples. Same-sex couples will be denied coverage for these
expensive treatments because, under the statute, they can never
qualify as infertile, which is required for insurance coverage. 8 The
Infertility Insurance Mandate defines “infertility” as a “condition of
an otherwise presumably healthy individual who is unable to
conceive or sustain a pregnancy during a period of one year.” 9 As
such, same-sex couples are “structurally” infertile; they cannot
conceive naturally and are dependent on ART. This type of
infertility is not included within the definition of infertility under
the Infertility Insurance Mandate. The statute’s definition of
infertility sets out a standard that, when applied, excludes samesex couples from obtaining insurance coverage, thus depriving them
of the same rights afforded to opposite-sex couples. Therefore, the
Infertility Insurance Mandate is unconstitutional because it

Id.

procedures shall not be excluded from reimbursement when provided
attendant to the diagnosis and treatment of infertility for women
between the ages of twenty-five (25) and forty-two (42) years;
provided, that a subscriber copayment, not to exceed twenty percent
(20%), may be required for those programs and/or procedures the sole
purpose of which is the treatment of infertility.
(b) For purposes of this section, “infertility” means the condition of an
otherwise presumably healthy individual who is unable to conceive or
sustain a pregnancy during a period of one year.
(c) For purposes of this section, “standard fertility-preservation
services” means procedures consistent with established medical
practices and professional guidelines published by the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine, the American Society of Clinical
Oncology, or other reputable professional medical organizations.
(d) For purposes of this section, “iatrogenic infertility” means an
impairment of fertility by surgery, radiation, chemotherapy, or other
medical treatment affecting reproductive organs or processes.
(e) For purposes of this section, “may directly or indirectly cause”
means treatment with a likely side effect of infertility as established
by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, the American
Society of Clinical Oncology, or other reputable professional
organizations.
(f) The health insurance contract may limit coverage to a lifetime cap
of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
8.
9.

See id. § 27-19-23(b).
Id.
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violates a same-sex couple’s Due Process and Equal Protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
To correct this
unconstitutional statute, the Rhode Island General Assembly
should amend the Infertility Insurance Mandate to include samesex couples in the statutory definition of infertility.
Part I of this Comment provides a background on same-sex
reproductive rights, including the different options a same-sex
couple has for reproduction, along with the history of the Infertility
Insurance Mandate and how it compares to other states’ statutes
that include same-sex couples. Specifically, this Part points out
that other states’ statutes explicitly include same-sex couples,
which provides examples for Rhode Island to follow. Part II
analyzes how the Infertility Insurance Mandate violates same-sex
couples’ Due Process and Equal Protection rights, and thus is
unconstitutional. Part II will also propose statutory language that
should be added to the Infertility Insurance Mandate, with similar
language used in other state statutes that explicitly include samesex couples in their definition of infertility. Finally, Part III
concludes that the Infertility Insurance Mandate must be changed
to include same-sex couples, arguing that they are constitutionally
entitled to the same opportunities to have biological children that
are provided to opposite-sex couples.
I. THE VARIOUS ART OPTIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCES THE
INFERTILITY INSURANCE MANDATE HAS ON SAME-SEX COUPLES

A. Where Same-Sex Reproductive Rights Stand Today
As marriage rights have expanded for same-sex couples since
the United States Supreme Court holding in Obergefell v. Hodges,
it follows that same-sex reproductive rights should be expanding as
well. 10 The decision in Obergefell is a crucial link between the
reproductive rights previously awarded to opposite-sex couples and
those that should apply to same-sex couples. 11 In Obergefell, the
Supreme Court equated the right to marry for same-sex couples to
the right to procreation when it said: “[l]ike choices concerning
contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing,
10. See 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
11. See Kristiana P. Boutell, Note, Redefining Infertility After Obergefell v.
Hodges: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Warrants Infertility Insurance
Coverage for Same-Sex Couples to Achieve Biological Parenthood, 595 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 597, 652 (2017).
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all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning
marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can
make.” 12 When considering the reproductive rights of same-sex
couples, the language of Obergefell makes it clear that procreation
is a “correlating privilege of marriage,” and therefore same-sex
couples inherently have the same reproductive rights as an
opposite-sex couple. 13
The Supreme Court held in Skinner v. Oklahoma, that
sterilization as a criminal punishment was unconstitutional
because even criminals have the right to procreation. 14 Since this
decision in 1942, it has been understood that “[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race.” 15 Throughout the years, reproductive rights have been
equated to the right to privacy, with the discussion focused mainly
on women’s reproductive rights.16 Through this evolution of case
law and the development of the “right to privacy,” women have been
granted the rights to avoid pregnancies. 17 Therefore, it logically
follows that individuals also have the right to choose when they
want to bear a child.18
With same-sex couples, the problem lies in how to protect their
right to choose when they want to have their own child. Same-sex
couples are “structurally infertile,” meaning that they cannot
naturally conceive through unprotected sexual intercourse, and
instead must rely on ART to produce a biological child.19 This
means they are essentially in the same position as an infertile
opposite-sex couple.20 Supreme Court precedent has established
that fertile individuals clearly have a right to procreate, so the
question becomes, as one commenter put it: “[i]f fertile persons
12. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (emphasis added).
13. Boutell, supra note 11, at 652.
14. See 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).
15. Id. at 541.
16. Jill Lepore, To Have and to Hold, NEW YORKER (May 18, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/25/to-have-and-to-hold
[https://perma.cc/GE9X-7B33].
17. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (allowing the
right to use contraceptives); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
(allowing the right to abortion).
18. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (allowing the right to
“bear or beget” a child).
19. Boutell, supra note 11, at 598.
20. See id. Heterosexual infertility is referred to as medical infertility; this
is how the majority of the public understands the definition of infertility. Id.
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possess a right to reproduce, shouldn’t infertile persons be extended
the same rights through the vehicle of ARTs?” 21 The following
section will define the different ART options available to same-sex
couples, which are their only viable options to have the same
reproductive rights that the Supreme Court affords to an oppositesex couple.
B. The Different Forms of ART
ART is a process that assists infertile individuals. Same-sex
couples are dependent on ART because, as stated above, they are
structurally infertile. 22 As a solution, there are three forms of ART
that a same-sex couple could use to have a biological child: (1) in
vitro fertilization (IVF); (2) intrauterine insemination (IUI); and (3)
gestational surrogacy.
IVF is a procedure in which the doctor fertilizes the egg with a
sperm outside of the body and transfers the embryo into the
female’s uterus.23 IVF, however, does not always produce the
highest success rates. IVF has a success rate of 15.6% after one
cycle, 24 which means that most couples who go through this
treatment will require more than one cycle. A recent study showed
that IVF is most successful after six to nine cycles, 25 with an
average cost of $11,500 per cycle. 26 Thus, a same-sex couple
without insurance coverage could potentially pay more than
$103,500 to conceive a child using IVF.
A second ART option for same-sex couples is IUI, also known
as artificial insemination. This procedure is less expensive and less
intense than IVF. During this procedure, the doctor places the
sperm directly into the uterus in order to increase the chances of
the sperm fertilizing the egg. 27 Generally, the female is given
21. Radhika Rao, Conflicting Interests in Reproductive Autonomy and
Their Impact on New Technologies: the Personal Right: Privacy, Property, of
Child?: Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1463 (2008).
22. Boutell, supra note 11, at 598.
23. See, e.g., In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), CTR. FOR HUM. REPROD.
https://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/services/infertility-treatments/ivf/
howitworks/ [https://perma.cc/U2XT-2B8H] (last updated Nov. 15, 2014).
24. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) Success Rates, supra note 3.
25. Andrew D. A. C. Smith et al., supra note 4.
26. Cost of Fertility Treatment, supra note 2.
27. Artificial Insemination for Infertility, Intrauterine Insemination—IUI,
ADVANCED FERTILITY CTR. OF CHI. (2017), https://www.advancedfertility.com
/insem.htm [https://perma.cc/UL3U-B53S].

2019]

INFERTILITY INSURANCE MANDATE

337

rounds of medication before the procedure to increase the amount
of eggs released. 28 The cost of IUI can range from $300 to $800,
plus the cost of the medication given to the female before the
procedure.29 Depending on the drugs administered, the success
rate for a single insemination is approximately ten to fifteen
percent. 30 A doctor will usually only attempt IUI three times before
moving on to a more accurate procedure, such as IVF. 31
A third ART option is gestational surrogacy, more commonly
known as surrogacy. 32 All male-male couples need to utilize this
form of ART, in addition to IVF or IUI, because a surrogate female
would need to be impregnated and carry the child until birth. 33 The
cost of surrogacy can range anywhere from $65,000 to $100,000,
including the associated costs such as legal fees, agency fees,
surrogate mother compensation, and the cost of the fertilization. 34
As far as success rates go, a same-sex couple using surrogacy would
need to use some form of ART in order to impregnate the
surrogate.35 Couples that use surrogacy risk an even higher cost if
the IVF or IUI procedures require more than one cycle to be
successful. Surrogacy, just like the two other forms of ART, has its
own risks, which can be discouraging to couples who know they
must face these costs out-of-pocket. As the following section will
discuss, the Infertility Insurance Mandate has been amended
throughout the years to expand the range of people who receive
insurance coverage for these expensive treatments. However, there
has yet to be a change in the Infertility Insurance Mandate that
would also include same-sex couples.
C. How the Infertility Insurance Mandate Has Changed

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Gestational Surrogacy: Definition & Explanation, FERTILITY
SOLUTIONS,
https://www.fertilitysolutionsne.com/treatment-options/
gestational-surrogacy [https://perma.cc/XLD6-YSJX] (last visited Apr. 7,
2019).
33. Id. Of course, this can also be used for a female-female couple, but if
medically capable, one of the female partners could carry the child in order to
cut down on costs of the already expensive treatments. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id.
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Throughout the Years
The year 1989 not only brought Rhode Island’s first “test-tube
baby,” 36 but also saw the enactment of the first of many versions of
the Infertility Insurance Mandate. 37 Currently, the statute states
that if a person’s insurance plan provides coverage for pregnancy,
the plan “shall provide coverage for medically necessary expenses
of diagnosis and treatment of infertility for women between the
ages of twenty-five (25) and forty-two (42) . . . for standard fertilitypreservation services . . . .” 38 The statute allows an insurance
company to limit coverage to a “lifetime cap” of $100,000. 39 The
statute does not define the treatments that are required to obtain
coverage, but it seems logical that at least IVF or IUI would fall into
the category of “medically necessary” treatments for infertility.40
The initial version of the statute required an insurance
company to provide coverage for “medically necessary expenses of
diagnosis and treatment of infertility” only if the plan provided
coverage for pregnancy. 41 Originally, the statute defined infertility
as “the condition of an otherwise presumably healthy married
individual who is unable to conceive or produce conception during
a period of one (1) year.” 42 The general public met the enactment
of the Infertility Insurance Mandate with mixed approval.
Insurance companies urged against passage because the more
expansive the mandate, the more premiums would increase.43
Alternatively, infertile couples were hopeful the law would pass, as
they seemed to be the focus for the purpose of passing this

36. Douglas R. Riggs, First Baby Born in R.I. In-Vitro Program,
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 5, 1989, at A-01. “Test-tube baby” is a term commonly
used to refer to a child born through IVF. Id.
37. H.B. 6373, 1989 Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1989).
38. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-19-23.
39. Id.
40. Meghan Boone, It’s Only Covered if You Keep It: The Legality of
Surrogacy Pregnancy Exclusions in Health Insurance Policies, 14 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 677, 686 (2013). Although it is the only option for a male samesex couple to have a biological child, it might not be considered “medically
necessary” under the Rhode Island statute. See id. This is its own issue
outside the scope of this Comment.
41. H.B. 6373.
42. Id. This definition has since changed. See infra text accompanying
note 49.
43. Kevin Sullivan, Bill Would Compel Insurers to Cover In Vitro
Fertilization, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 11, 1989, at C-01.
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legislation. 44 Deeming the original version of this statute the
“Family Building Act,” the Rhode Island General Assembly heard
testimony from infertile individuals about how much this bill would
help the struggle they had been going through because of the highpriced cost of treatment.45
Small changes continued to be made to the Infertility
Insurance Mandate. 46 The next big change to the statute occurred
in 2007 when the Rhode Island General Assembly sought to
eliminate the requirement that “infertile” individuals be married in
order to receive coverage. 47 Lawmakers passed a bill which
effectuated the removal of this requirement, but the Governor
quickly vetoed the bill. 48 In a letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Governor expressed concerns that allowing
this expansion to include unmarried women was not only
“‘unnecessary and unwarranted, and allows for even further
creeping of cost in our health care system,’” but also “‘force[d] health
insurance companies to subsidize out-of-wedlock births.’” 49 With
the veto came cries of dissatisfaction from the public. 50 Many called
for all women to receive fertility treatments regardless of their
marital status; one woman stated, “the word ‘married’ makes what
would be a compassionate mandate simply unjust.” 51
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See H.B. 7120, 2005–06 Leg. Sess. (R.I. 2005) (set the maximum age at
forty years old and increased the prescribed period for how long a married
couple must attempt to conceive before receiving coverage); see also S.B. 453,
2007 Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2007) (increased the maximum age for coverage to fortytwo years old and decreased the prescribed period for conception down to one
year).
47. See H.B. 5251, 2007 Legis. Bill Hist. (R.I. 2007) (vetoed) [hereinafter
Governor’s Message]; see also Lisa Vernon-Sparks, Expanded Infertility
Coverage Vetoed, PROVIDENCE J., July 20, 2007, at B-01.
48. Vernon-Sparks, supra note 47. The Governor of Rhode Island at this
time was Donald Carcieri. Id.
49. Governor’s Message, supra note 47.
50. See Rebecca Laptook, Letters to The Editor, PROVIDENCE J., May 12,
2017, at A14.
51. Id.
If a single woman had cancer or any other documented medical issue,
she would not be denied coverage based on her marital status, or her
gender, sexual orientation, race or religion. In this day and age of
striving for equality, this state law is in immediate need of
reevaluation and reform.
Id.
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Despite numerous attempts, the marriage requirement was not
repealed until 2017. 52 This long-awaited amendment now allows
for unmarried women to receive insurance coverage for infertility
treatments. 53 Coinciding with the amendment to remove the
marriage requirement from the Infertility Insurance Mandate’s
definition of infertility, the Rhode Island General Assembly
expanded coverage under the statute, bringing it to its current
version.54 This additional component to the Infertility Insurance
Mandate provides coverage for “standard fertility-preservation” for
women who are at risk of becoming infertile due to medical
treatments such as chemotherapy or radiation, also known as
“iatrogenic infertility.” 55 Even though the removal of the marriage
requirement was ten years in the making, the 2017 amendment to
the Infertility Insurance Mandate was most notable because it
effectuated the inclusion of women with iatrogenic infertility.56
After the 2017 amendment, Rhode Island became the first state in
the country to mandate coverage for both ART for women who are
infertile under the statute’s definition and for fertility preservation
procedures for women with iatrogenic infertility. 57
Each amendment to the Infertility Insurance Mandate
expanded the reach of the statute, providing insurance coverage to
a wider range of individuals. Unfortunately, the definition of
infertility under the Infertility Insurance Mandate still deprives
same-sex couples of benefits that are provided to unmarried
heterosexual women and opposite sex-couples.
D. The Infertility Insurance Mandate’s Definition of Infertility
and What It Means for Same Sex Couples
As it stands, the Infertility Insurance Mandate defines
infertility as “the condition of an otherwise presumably healthy
individual who is unable to conceive or sustain a pregnancy during
52. H.B. 6170, 2017 Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017).
53. Id.
54. See id.; see also 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-19-23.
55. § 27-19-23(c).
56. See, e.g., RI Becomes First State to Explicitly Require Coverage for
Fertility Preservation for At-Risk Patients, WOMEN AND INFANTS (July 31, 2017),
http://www.womenandinfants.org/news/fertility-preservation-legislation.cfm
[https://perma.cc/MX9D-W5SC]; see also Lynn Arditi, RI News, PROVIDENCE J.,
Aug. 2, 2017, at A6.
57. RI Becomes First State to Explicitly Require Coverage for Fertility
Preservation for At-Risk Patients, supra note 56; Arditi, supra note 56.
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a period of one year.” 58 Therefore, under the statute, a woman must
attempt to conceive for one full year before she can receive
insurance coverage.59 For an opposite-sex couple, this can be
accomplished at no cost through unprotected intercourse. However,
a same-sex couple does not have that option if they wish to conceive
a child with each other. Instead of being considered medically
infertile, same-sex couples are considered structurally infertile. 60
Structurally infertile means that in order for a couple to reproduce,
they must do so through a manner other than sexual intercourse
because biologically they cannot do so.61 Therefore, same-sex
couples are not able to reproduce without ART, but a same-sex
couple cannot receive coverage for those procedures because they
are unable to satisfy the statutory definition of infertility. Thus,
this section of the Infertility Insurance Mandate must be amended
to include same-sex couples.
E. How the Infertility Insurance Mandate Compares to Those in
Other States
Fifteen states mandate insurance coverage for infertility
treatments. 62
These statutes vary in restrictions and
requirements. 63
In comparison, Rhode Island’s Infertility
Insurance Mandate falls in the middle between the most restrictive
statutes and statutes that expressly allow for same-sex couples to
receive coverage. 64 In reviewing the state statutes that mandate
insurance coverage for infertility treatments, the most important
difference is how each state defines infertility. There is a clear
dichotomy in how states define infertility; states statutorily define
infertility to either exclude same-sex couples by setting an
unattainable standard—like Rhode Island—or explicitly include
same-sex couples.65 Thus, because the exclusion of same-sex
couples is unconstitutional as applied, Rhode Island should
58. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-19-23(b).
59. Id.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21.
61. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible
Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 24 (2008).
62. State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment,
NCSL (Apr. 27, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurancecoverage-for-infertility-laws.aspx#1 [https://perma.cc/K8NS-DZBC].
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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explicitly include same-sex couples as other states do.
The Infertility Insurance Mandate is not as restrictive or
outright exclusive as other states. Some states, such as Hawaii,
limit coverage to only a single round of IVF and still contain the
marriage requirement that Rhode Island repealed in 2017. 66
Additionally, unlike other states’ statutes, Rhode Island’s statute
does not explicitly require that an individual conceive through
“unprotected sexual intercourse.” For example, under Illinois’s
statute, infertility is defined as “the inability to conceive after one
year of unprotected sexual intercourse.” 67 Where the Illinois
statute excludes same-sex couples by setting a standard that a
same-sex couple clearly cannot meet, Rhode Island’s statue is more
discreet, but still is discriminatory when applied to same-sex
couples.
Conversely, two states, California and Maryland,
expressly include same-sex couples in their statutes. 68
1.

California’s Statute Expressly Includes Same-Sex Couples in
Its Definition of Infertility

California expressly includes same-sex couples in its statute by
listing specific groups of people against whom insurance companies
cannot discriminate.69 California is unique because the statutory
definition of infertility still contains the “heteronormative
language” that other states like Illinois have.70 The California
statutory definition of infertility is “the inability to conceive a
pregnancy or to carry a pregnancy to a live birth after a year or
more of regular sexual relations without contraception.” 71 Instead
of amending the definition of infertility, California, in 2013, added
language that states, “coverage for the treatment of infertility shall
be offered and, if purchased, provided without discrimination on the
basis of . . . sexual orientation.” 72 A simple change like this could
solve the huge problem that the Rhode Island statute is causing for
66. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2005); Valarie Blake, It’s an ART not
a Science: State-Mandated Insurance Coverage of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies and Legal Implications for Gay and Unmarried Persons, 12 MINN.
J. L. SCI. & TECH 651, 670 (2011).
67. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356m(2)(c) (West 2008); Blake, supra
note 66, at 667.
68. Boutell, supra note 11, at 629.
69. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(g) (West 2013).
70. Boutell, supra note 11, at 630–31.
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(b).
72. Id. § 1374.55; Boutell, supra note 11, at 630.
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same-sex couples. Amending the Infertility Insurance Mandate to
include language similar to California’s statute would make Rhode
Island’s statute constitutional without having to amend the
definition of infertility, especially because the Infertility Insurance
Mandate’s definition of infertility does not explicitly require the
inability to conceive through natural intercourse, which is more
inclusive than the California statute.
2.

Maryland Makes it “Impermissible” to Exclude Same-Sex
Couples from Receiving Insurance Coverage for ART

In 2015, when Maryland amended its statute for infertility
insurance coverage, it did not change its definition of infertility.73
Instead, the Maryland Insurance Code set out “impermissible
requirements” that prohibited insurance companies from setting
certain requirements that would discriminate against same-sex
couples. 74 Specifically, the statute states a company cannot
require a condition of . . . coverage, for a patient who is
married to an individual of the same sex: (1) that the
patient’s spouse’s sperm be used in the covered treatments
or procedures; or (2) that the patient demonstrates
infertility exclusively by means of a history of unsuccessful
heterosexual intercourse. 75
Due to the structure of the Infertility Insurance Mandate, the
Rhode Island General Assembly would have to make substantial
changes to its statute to add Maryland’s impermissible
requirements and, thus, it is not as simple of a solution as the
California method, which would simply require the legislature to
add language barring discrimination based on sexual orientation.
3.

New Jersey Has Different “Scenarios” in Which Same-Sex
Couples Would Qualify for Insurance Coverage of ART

New Jersey is the third state that has amended its definition
of infertility, but only after a lawsuit sparked the need for new
legislation. 76 In 2016, four lesbians sued the state of New Jersey
73. Boutell, supra note 11, at 631–32.
74. Id.
75. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810(b) (West 2016).
76. See Krupa v. N.J. State Health Benefits Comm’n, No. 2:16-cv-4637SDW-LDW, 2018 WL 513208 (D. N.J. Jan. 23, 2018).
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arguing that its statute was unconstitutional because it did not
account for lesbian couples who rely on sperm donors.77 New
Jersey has since changed its definition to include a list of different
“scenarios” in which an individual would be able to receive
coverage. It appears that there are two scenarios that lesbian
couples could fall into: (1) “A female without a male partner and
under 35 years of age who is unable to conceive after 12 failed
attempts of intrauterine insemination under medical supervision”;
or (2) “A female without a male partner and over 35 years of age
who is unable to conceive after six failed attempts of intrauterine
insemination.” 78 New Jersey was compelled to change its statute
due to the public backlash it received for originally excluding samesex couples from receiving insurance coverage. Rhode Island
should learn from New Jersey and be proactive to change its statute
before a lawsuit is filed. The following section will propose new
language for the Rhode Island statute, along with the reasons why
it needs to change in the first place.
II. THE INFERTILITY INSURANCE MANDATE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
WHEN APPLIED AND SHOULD BE AMENDED TO EXPLICITLY INCLUDE
SAME-SEX COUPLES

Article I, Section 2 of the Rhode Island State Constitution is
the state’s version of the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses. 79 When this section was drafted, both gender and race
were specifically included as classes with guaranteed protection,
but sexual orientation was not because the legislative committee in
charge of drafting these provisions did not interpret the word
“gender” to include sexual orientation.80 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court has stated that, when analyzing Article I, Section
2, the court will refer to the same analysis a federal court would use
in analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.81 The following analysis will mirror the analysis
used by courts when evaluating the United States Constitution,

77.
78.
79.
80.

Livio, supra note 6.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:48-6x(a)(4)–(5) (2017).
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2.
PATRICK T. CONLEY & ROBERT G. FLANDERS, JR., THE RHODE ISLAND
STATE CONSTITUTION 56–57 (2011).
81. See Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734, 738 (R.I.
1992).
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which is simply a baseline or minimum law that can be enforced.82
Rhode Island, like all states, is allowed to implement stricter laws
that guarantee its citizens further protections so long as these laws
do not violate the United States Constitution.83 For example, in
2001, Rhode Island provided additional protections to homosexual
individuals by enacting a law that safeguards homosexual
individuals, along with a long list of other classifications, from
discrimination when seeking employment.84 Therefore, concerning
the Infertility Insurance Mandate, Rhode Island could provide
additional protections to same-sex couples without a court’s ruling
that the statute is unconstitutional.
A. The Infertility Insurance Mandate Violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The right to procreate and the decision to reproduce has long
been grounded in an individual’s right to privacy. 85 Through the
United States Supreme Court’s classification of this right to
privacy, the right to reproduce is a fundamental right guaranteed
to the citizens of the United States. 86 An individual’s constitutional
right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment can be
Procedural due process
violated in two different ways. 87
guarantees that the procedure a government uses to enact laws is
not defective, and substantive due process guarantees that the
government cannot deprive someone of his or her fundamental
82. See Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of
Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1398 (2006).
83. See id.
84. See 28 R.I. GEN LAWS § 28-5-3 (2001) (“It is declared to be the public
policy of this state to foster the employment of all individuals in this state in
accordance with their fullest capacities, regardless of their race . . . sexual
orientation, gender identity or expression, . . . and to safeguard their right to
obtain and hold employment without such discrimination.”).
85. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.”).
86. See Rao, supra note 21, at 1462.
87. Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 197 (1979) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not only accords procedural
safeguards to protected interests, but likewise protects substantive aspects of
liberty against impermissible governmental restrictions.”).
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rights. 88
The Infertility Insurance Mandate violates a same-sex couple’s
substantive due process rights because it takes away their
fundamental right to procreate. Determining that the Infertility
Insurance Mandate violates substantive due process is guided by
three factors set out by the United States Supreme Court: first, the
type of private interest that is being affected; second, the risk of
deprivation of this private interest; and third, the government’s
interest in justifying their otherwise unconstitutional action. 89
Courts employ a strict scrutiny standard when applying these
factors to determine whether the government is depriving an
individual of his or her fundamental rights—like the right to
procreate.90 Under strict scrutiny, which is the most stringent
standard of the judicial reviews, the government has a “heavy
burden of justification,” and the discriminatory law must be
narrowly tailored to achieving the governmental interest. 91 The
Infertility Insurance Mandate restricts same-sex couples’
fundamental right to procreate and therefore the statute is subject
to strict scrutiny. 92
When examining the first factor—the type of private interest
that is being affected—a court must determine if that private
interest is a fundamental right. Supreme Court precedent makes
it clear that the right to procreate is a fundamental liberty, which
is the type of private interest that triggers a substantive due
process analysis.93 In Skinner, when deciding on the law that
allowed for sterilization as a criminal punishment, the Court stated
that the law “deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic
to the perpetuation of a race—the right to have offspring.” 94 This
concept was reinforced in Eisenstadt v. Baird, where the Court
recognized the right of both married and unmarried individuals to
purchase contraceptives.95 In that case, the Court said that the
decision to “bear or beget a child” was an individual fundamental
right and because of this, a person should be free from any
88. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755–56 (1997).
89. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
90. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978).
91. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1973).
92. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 536.
95. 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972).
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governmental intrusion into the choice to bear a child.96 Therefore,
because Rhode Island is denying insurance coverage for same-sex
couples, it is infringing on their substantive due process right to
choose “to bear” a biological child, making the law
unconstitutional.97
In addition to the clear rulings from the Supreme Court,
indicating that the fundamental right to procreation triggers the
first factor of the analysis, Supreme Court precedent indicates this
private interest applies to same-sex couples. Considering the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Zablocki v. Redhail and Obergefell, a
logical connection can be made between the fundamental right of
same-sex couples to marry and the fundamental right to
procreate.98 In Zablocki, the Court directly connected the right to
procreate with the right to marry by not only saying that the
decision to marry “has been placed on the same level of importance”
as decisions such as procreation, but by also stating that “if [the]
right to procreate means anything at all,” it must imply some right
to enter into a marriage. 99 Obergefell then reiterated this
connection when the Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental
right to marry applied to same-sex couples.100 Therefore, because
the Court held in Obergefell that same-sex couples have the
fundamental right to marry, and the Court concluded in Zablocki,
that the right to marry goes “hand-in-hand” with the right to
procreate, procreation is clearly a fundamental right of same-sex
couples. 101
Because procreation is the type of private interest that is
fundamental, and this right applies to same-sex couples, the
analysis must continue with the second and third factor in order to
show that the Infertility Insurance Mandate violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Looking to the
second factor, the Infertility Insurance Mandate is denying
insurance coverage for ART, and therefore the private interest of
procreation is at a very high risk of being deprived because ART is

96. Id. at 453.
97. See Boutell, supra note 11, at 655.
98. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978).
99. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
100. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
101. See Boutell, supra note 11, at 655.
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the only way a same-sex couple can have a biological child.102
Finally, as to the third factor, there is no strong government
interest that would justify excluding same-sex couples under the
Infertility Insurance Mandate. 103 When the government is denying
insurance coverage for ART to same-sex couples, it would be
“difficult to conceive any potential reasons that are not ludicrous”
as to what the governmental interest would be, especially where
insurance coverage to procreate via ART has been afforded to
opposite-sex couples since 1989.104
When strict scrutiny is applied to the three factors, it is clear
that the Infertility Insurance Mandate is unconstitutional because
there is no adequate justification as to why Rhode Island is allowing
opposite-sex couples to pursue their fundamental right, while
prohibiting same-sex couples from the same opportunity. 105
Without adequate justification, meaning that there is no
government interest behind this statute, the Infertility Insurance
Mandate violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Therefore, Rhode Island should amend the statute to
afford same-sex couples their constitutional right to procreate.
B. The Infertility Insurance Mandate Violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Along with the Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment also contains the Equal Protection Clause, which
affords citizens of the United States “equal protection of the
laws.” 106 The Supreme Court has made it clear that statutes
implicating certain suspect and quasi-suspect characteristics, such
as race and sex, require the Court to apply a heightened level of
scrutiny when reviewing the statute. 107 Sexual orientation is not
one of the characteristics that require heightened scrutiny. 108
Therefore, because the Infertility Insurance Mandate discriminates
based on sexual orientation, the statute is only subject to a rational

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
(2011).
108.

Id.
Id. at 654.
See id. at 655–56.
See id. at 655.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756
Id.
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basis review, which is the lowest standard. 109 The problem with
rational basis review is that it “generally results in the validation
of state action,” and thus, a court would likely conclude that the
Infertility Insurance Mandate does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 110 In order to bypass this result, same-sex couples can
make three possible arguments which arise out of three different
Supreme Court cases.
First, sexual orientation should be
considered a class that requires a heightened scrutiny standard. 111
Second, even if sexual orientation is not considered a class that
requires heightened scrutiny, a law nevertheless cannot target or
discriminate against certain groups. 112 Finally, a law violates the
Equal Protection Clause if there is evidence of a discriminatory
impact and a discriminatory intent. 113
1.

Lawrence v. Texas Suggests Sexual Orientation is a Class
Subject to Strict Scrutiny

The Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas held that a Texas law
prohibiting same-sex sodomy was unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause because homosexual individuals have the
fundamental right to choose those with whom they are intimate. 114
However the Court left room for interpretation that sexual
orientation can be a classification that is subject to strict
scrutiny.115 In fact, the Court stated that an argument for Equal
Protection was “tenable.” 116 The Lawrence Court combined both an
Equal Protection and Due Process argument, and ultimately
recognized that a continuation of discrimination would “demean[ ]
the lives of homosexual persons.” 117 The holding in Lawrence, that
109. Id.
110. Id. at 755–56.
111. Boutell, supra note 11, at 653.
112. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Boutell, supra note 11, at
654.
113. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976); Blake, supra note
66, at 684.
114. 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
115. Id.; see Boutell, supra note 11, at 652–53.
116. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75; Yoshino, supra note 107, at 777.
117. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. The Court recognized the importance
of both an Equal Protection and Due Process argument, stating:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked
in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both
interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which
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same-sex couples had the right to privacy in consensual adult
sexual activity, can be applied to same-sex couples receiving
insurance coverage for ART because the choice to have a biological
child is a private consensual choice that should also be protected for
same-sex couples.118
The Court’s acknowledgment of an Equal Protection argument
for sexual orientation benefitted same-sex couples more than
opposite-sex couples, which as one commenter notes, gives
Lawrence “undertones of equality.” 119 These “undertones” are the
Court’s suggestion that sexual orientation requires the Court to
apply strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In light of
Lawrence, if sexual orientation is a classification that requires
strict scrutiny review, the Infertility Insurance Mandate is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it “implicitly discriminate[s]
against same-sex couples via heteronormative infertility
definitions.” 120
2.

Romer v. Evans Prevents the Rhode Island Government from
Targeting Same-Sex Couples as an “Unpopular Group”

Even if a court were to decline to recognize sexual orientation
as a protected class, Romer v. Evans provides another way to argue
that the Infertility Insurance Mandate is unconstitutional. 121
Under Romer, even if a court were to apply rational basis to the
sexual orientation classification, an unpopular group cannot be
targeted and discriminated against. 122 However, the Court in
Romer strayed away from the typical deference provided under the
rational basis test, and applied a different version of this test,
referred to as “rational basis with bite standard.” 123 In Romer,
Colorado passed a law that prohibited sexual orientation from being
recognized as a protected class. 124 The Court ruled that the law
does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma
might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal
protection reasons.

Id.
118. See id. at 578.
119. Yoshino, supra note 107, at 779.
120. Boutell, supra note 11, at 653.
121. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
122. Id. at 634.
123. See Yoshino, supra note 107, at 760.
124. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
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violated the Equal Protection Clause, stating, “[a] law declaring
that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens
than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial
of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.” 125
The Infertility Insurance Mandate deprives same-sex couples
of their right to procreate because it is more difficult for them to get
the “aid” provided under the statute due to their sexual orientation.
Under the “rational basis with bite” standard, the Infertility
Insurance Mandate fails this test because there cannot be a
legitimate government interest behind a law that targets an
unpopular group. 126 Under the Court’s reasoning in Romer, it is
clear that the Infertility Insurance Mandate violates the Equal
Protection Clause because the government is making it more
difficult for one group, same-sex couples, to procreate, which means
that it is targeting an “unpopular group.”
3.

Washington v. Davis Makes the Infertility Insurance Mandate
Unconstitutional by Proving Discriminatory Intent

The Court in Washington v. Davis held that a “disproportionate
impact” is not enough to trigger a strict scrutiny standard, unless
there is evidence that a state enacted a statute with “discriminatory
intent.” 127 The Infertility Insurance Mandate clearly has a
disproportionate impact on same-sex couples when it comes to
receiving coverage for ART. The question then becomes: is there
enough evidence to show that the Rhode Island General Assembly
had the discriminatory intent required to make this law
unconstitutional? To establish a discriminatory intent, it must be
125. Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 634 (“‘If the constitutional conception of “equal protection of the
laws” means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to
harm
a
politically
unpopular
group
cannot
constitute
a legitimate governmental interest.’” (quoting Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
127. See 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); see also Yoshino, supra note 107, at 763–
64. Davis involved a racial discrimination case, but the standard of
disproportionate impact can still apply to the sexual orientation context in
attempting to get a court to apply strict scrutiny. See id. at 242. In discussing
disproportionate impact, the Court stated, “[d]isproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination
forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that
racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are
justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.” Id. (internal citation
omitted).
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shown that Rhode Island desired a “particular discriminatory
result,” a mere “side-effect or consequence” of discriminatory intent
is insufficient to make a law unconstitutional. 128 It can be difficult
to ascertain whether a legislature enacted a statute with
discriminatory intent. However, Davis provides a suggestion that
one way to prove this is when “‘the discrimination is very difficult
to explain on nonracial ground.’” 129 Although Davis was concerned
about race, this can be applied to a sexual orientation classification
as well.130 If there is evidence that the Rhode Island government
intended to discriminate against same sex-couples by denying them
insurance coverage for ART, the Infertility Insurance Mandate is
unconstitutional.131
When examining the Infertility Insurance Mandate, it is
“difficult to explain” why the government is limiting ART to a
certain group of people, other than for a discriminatory reason. As
one scholar puts it, if you compare the Infertility Insurance
Mandate to discriminatory laws struck down by the Supreme Court
in the equal protection cases discussed above,
a law limiting ARTs to married persons or to heterosexual
persons should fail because it would treat the very same
act—the use of a particular technology—differently based
upon the marital status or sexual preference of the persons
involved, with no real basis for the distinction other than
societal disapproval or prejudice. 132
Looking into the legislative history of the Infertility Insurance
Mandate, there is an indication of “societal disapproval.” In 2007,
the Governor of Rhode Island wrote a letter stating his disapproval
of removing the marriage requirement from the Infertility
Insurance Mandate. 133 He wrote that, as a matter of “public
policy,” the legislature should not pass laws that promote children
born to unmarried parents, and that the Infertility Insurance
Mandate was intended to be “a narrow and appropriate state policy”
for married couples.134 At that time, gay marriage was not legal in
Rhode Island, so same-sex couples and their children were included
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Blake, supra note 66, at 684.
Id. (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 242).
Id. at 685.
Id.
See Rao, supra note 21, at 1475–76.
Governor’s Message, supra note 47.
Id.
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in the groups of people to which the governor expressed the
Infertility Insurance Mandate should not be expanded to cover. 135
The marriage requirement has since been repealed, but there has
never been further legislation making it clear that this statute is
not intended to discriminate against same-sex couples. 136 Today,
the Infertility Insurance Mandate is still discriminating against
same-sex couples because they cannot satisfy the statutory
definition of infertility, based solely on their sexual orientation.
Therefore, undertones of this disapproval towards same-sex couples
still show through the Infertility Insurance Mandate, and the
Rhode Island government, at least initially, desired a particular
discriminatory result when it passed the law, which the Davis
Court required as a prerequisite for strict scrutiny review.
A careful analysis of the cases discussed above leads to the
conclusion that the Infertility Insurance Mandate violates Equal
Protection, but it is critical to recognize that the statute does more
than just place same-sex couples at an economic disadvantage in
comparison to opposite-sex couples. The problem goes much
deeper. Same-sex couples depend on ART because it is the only way
for them to create a biological child.137 The real problem with the
statute is that it creates an inequality among those who are able to
bear a child and those who are not. Under the Infertility Insurance
Mandate, the government has not only limited the uses of ART, it
has deprived a certain group of people from using ART altogether.
In this way, not only is the statute problematic, but it is also
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.138
C. Addressing Possible Counterarguments
There are two foreseeable counterarguments to the assertion
that the Infertility Insurance Mandate is unconstitutional. First,
the Infertility Insurance Mandate’s definition of infertility does not
135. 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 (2013) (“Any person who otherwise meets
the eligibility requirements of chapters 15-1 and 15-2 may marry any other
eligible person regardless of gender.”). As a result, same-sex marriage became
legal in Rhode Island in 2013. Id.
136. See supra text accompanying note 52.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21.
138. See Rao, supra note 21, at 1480 (“[L]ines drawn between different uses
of ARTs are much less constitutionally problematic than lines drawn based
upon the types of persons who seek to use ARTs.”).
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require a couple to be unable to naturally conceive through
unprotected intercourse; rather, the definition only refers to those
who are “unable to conceive or sustain a pregnancy during a period
of one year.” 139 One could argue that the definition does not
exclude same-sex couples because they can use ART for one year
without insurance coverage and pay the cost out-of-pocket, and if
the couple is unable to conceive within that year, then they can
receive the insurance coverage. However, this creates an inequality
for same-sex couples because the statute does not limit the inability
to conceive to those who are unable to conceive through ART. An
opposite-sex couple can attempt to naturally conceive through
unprotected intercourse for one year and then receive the coverage,
never having to pay the out-of-pocket prices their same-sex couple
counterpart did.140 As currently written, the Infertility Insurance
Mandate prevents same-sex couples from having a biological child
because without the ability to afford ART, they are left with no
other option when it comes to procreation.
The second counterargument is that, even if procreation is
recognized as a fundamental right under the Constitution, there is
no fundamental right to insurance coverage for ART. 141 Regardless
of the groups of people being discriminated against, “a state
government is currently under no obligation to provide access to
ART for anyone and, thus, can act to provide access to some and not
others without infringing on the due process privacy rights of its
citizens.” 142 This argument is correct in that neither the Rhode
Island courts nor the Supreme Court have declared that there is an
explicit right to ART; however, there is an implied right in the
fundamental right to procreate because ART is required in order for
same-sex couples to reproduce. 143 Because Rhode Island has this
insurance mandate for ART, it suggests that the State
acknowledges the right to insurance coverage for infertility
treatments for its citizens.144 Additionally, this suggests that
Rhode Island intends to provide additional protection beyond the
139. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-19-23.
140. See id.
141. Blake, supra note 66, at 682–83.
142. Id. at 683.
143. Brittany Raposa, Note, Maria’s Law: Extending Insurance Coverage
for Fertility Preservation to Cancer Patients in Massachusetts, 9 U. MASS. L.
REV. 334, 357 (2014).
144. See id.
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fundamental right of procreation currently recognized by the
Supreme Court.145 A same-sex couple cannot reproduce without
ART, so depriving them of this coverage and access to ART deprives
them of the fundamental right to procreate. 146 Accordingly, the
Infertility Insurance Mandate must be amended to comply with the
right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
D. Proposed Language for the Rhode Island Statute
In addition to pointing out the unconstitutionality of the
Infertility Insurance Mandate, it helps to suggest new language
that Rhode Island can add to effectuate the inclusion of same-sex
couples. The best and simplest option for the Rhode Island General
Assembly is to model its new language after the California
statute. 147 Under the guidance of the California Statute, the
legislature could include the following language in the Infertility
Insurance Mandate:
(g) . . . coverage for the treatment of infertility shall be
offered, and if purchased, without discrimination on the
basis of age, ancestry, color, disability, domestic partner
status, gender, gender expression, gender identity, genetic
information, marital status, national origin, race, religion,
sex, or sexual orientation. 148
The language explicitly includes same-sex couples and leaves
no room for doubt that insurance companies cannot deny coverage
to same-sex couples coverage based on their sexual orientation. The
proposed language provides a simple solution that eliminates the
need to amend the statutory definition of infertility because this
language makes it clear that same-sex couples cannot be
discriminated against. The current definition, when considered in
isolation, excludes same-sex couples, but the additional language
would put insurance companies on notice that opposite-sex couples
and same-sex couples must be treated equally, which means that
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2013).
148. Id. § 1374.55(g). This language comes directly from California’s
insurance mandate for ART. Of course, Rhode Island is free to change what it
wants to be covered under the statute and to add to or take away from this list.
The most important part of this list is the explicit inclusion of same-sex couples
by stating that insurance companies cannot discriminate based on sexual
orientation.
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they should pay the same prices. Even though the validity of the
Infertility Insurance Mandate has never successfully been
challenged in a lawsuit, amending the statute to include the
language proposed above is the best way to avoid such a
challenge. 149 The Infertility Insurance Mandate has evolved
substantially since its enactment in 1989, and the proposed
addition to the statutory language would be the final step in
ensuring that same-sex couples are being afforded the same
fundamental rights as opposite-sex couples.
CONCLUSION

The Infertility Insurance Mandate has been amended
numerous times since it was enacted in 1989. In 2017, the Rhode
Island General Assembly took a huge step in the right direction by
repealing the marriage requirement and making Rhode Island the
first state to mandate insurance coverage for fertility
preservation. 150 However, Rhode Island has continued to leave
same-sex couples without coverage, and has even made members of
the legislature unsure how the statute would apply to same-sex
couples. 151 There is no reason that the Rhode Island General
Assembly should not take one extra step to ensure that Rhode
Island is being inclusive of same-sex couples, and avoid the all-butinevitable constitutional challenges to the Infertility Insurance
Mandate. If Rhode Island did not intend to discriminate against
same-sex couples based on their sexual orientation, then there
should be no opposition to the suggested change in the Infertility
Insurance Mandate, as such amendments would confirm and make
it clear that same-sex couples are covered by the statute.
As the Infertility Insurance Mandate stands today, Paula and
Mary will not be able to have their own biological children unless
they spend a minimum of $66,000, a price that is eighty-two percent
of their annual combined income. 152 This is a price that their
149. See Krupa v. N.J. State Health Benefits Comm’n, No. 2:16-cv-4637SDW-LDW, 2018 WL 513208 (D. N.J. Jan. 23, 2018). For a discussion
concerning New Jersey and the lawsuit brought against it for its statute see
supra text accompanying note 6.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 52–57.
151. Lynn Arditi, Health Insurers Must Cover ‘Fertility Preservation’,
PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 2, 2017, at A1.
152. COMMUNITY SURVEY, CENSUS.GOV (2016), https://www.census.gov/data/
tables/time-series/demo/same-sex-couples/ssc-house-characteristics.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3WE-3ABP]. In 2016, the average household income for a
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neighbors, Sarah and Eric, will never have to pay because they can
meet the current statutory standard of infertility without spending
a single penny. Unfortunately, Paula and Mary, due solely to their
sexual orientation, can never meet this definition. A change in the
Infertility Insurance Mandate to provide the explicit inclusion of
same-sex couples is needed to make it clear that Paula and Mary
will obtain the insurance coverage that their fundamental right to
procreate requires. For Paula and Mary, and every other same-sex
couple in Rhode Island, their constitutional right to have a child is
dependent on ART, and without change, Rhode Island law is the
reason that these couples will not get the protections they deserve.

same-sex female-female couple was $80,755. Id.

